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Sloan: Torts

TORTS
FRANK K.

SLOAN*

Twenty-three decisions in the field of torts were handed down by
the Supreme Court and by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in the past year, eighteen of them were automobile accident
cases. No distinctly new pronouncement of the law was made in
any of them. Perhaps the strongest impression from the whole of
them that the reader discovers, is that defendants appeal verdicts
as being excessive with dogged regularity, and the Supreme Court
rejects this ground of appeal with equal persistence. Indeed, in only
one appeal from a jury verdict did the appellants not appeal on the
ground of excessiveness, in Butler v. Temples' where the jury
awarded only $7,500 damages in a death case involving a small child
who was killed accidently by a neighbor backing a car out of the
yard.
For convenience the tort decisions considered below are divided
into negligence cases and into other classes of tort decisions considered.
Negligence
Pleading- The Supreme Court announced no new propositions in
the pleading of tort actions, but re-affirmed two propositions that are
worthy of notice to the practitioner. In Jackson v. Solomon2 the
court restated the rule that the party wishing to avail itself of the
doctrine of "last clear chance" must plead this matter affirmatively
or it will not be available. The doctrine of "last clear chance", being
closely akin to matters of contributory negligence, it seems proper that
it should be pleaded affirmatively. Chief Justice Baker also commented that the doctrine is probably equally applicable to the rights
of a defendant as to those of a plaintiff, although a ruling on this
point was not necessary to the decision. This also seems a correct
and logical holding.
The second decision involving a point of particular interest to the
pleader, and one which seems likely to produce some difficulties is
Johns v. Castles.3 The court re-affirmed the long established rule
that the plaintiff may at his election assert his claim against one or
0

Menber of the law firm of Cooper & Gary, Columbia, S. C.; LL.B., University of South
Law School.
Carolina, 1948; Instructor, University of South Carolina
1. 227 S.C. 496, 88 S.E. 2d 586 (1955).
2. 228 S.C. 225, 89 S.E. 2d 436 (1955).

3. 229 S.C. 51, 91 S.E. 2d 721 (1956).
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more or all of the joint tort-feasors; but restates the holding in Brown
v. Quinn,4 that this election by the plaintiff does not prevent the defendant in his counterclaim from joining other tort-feasors with the
plaintiff. This may well result in a tendency to bring all of the parties involved into the court in one action and thus tend to consolidate
suits.
Danages- By far the most common subject in the tort decisions
is that of damages and their excessiveness. As noted above, only
one appellant resisted the temptation to argue the matter of excessiveness, although the Supreme Court has given little or no comfort
in this direction in many volumes of decisions. The decisions ranged
from Geiger v. Checker Cab Company,5 where the court held proper
the granting of a new trial for inadequate verdict of $1,600 in an
automobile collision case, all the way up to a holding that a $65,000
verdict was not excessive in a railroad crossing death case.
In the latter case, Mock v. Atlantic Coast Line, 6 the court apparently laid to rest any lingering doubt that it will refuse to grant
a new trial on the ground that a verdict is excessive. There the
jury gave a verdict of $50,000 actual damages plus $15,000 punitive
damages to a father for the death of a 12-year old son who was a
grade school student, and for whom no earning capacity to serve as
a basis for measure of damages could be proved. The decision quot-7
ed at length from Bowers v. Charleston & WC Railroad Company,
wherein the court stated that the power to reverse for excessive
verdicts "exists" but is rarely exercised. In sum the decision stated
that if the trial Judge does not see fit to grant a new trial nisi, then
the Supreme Court will not "interfere" by granting a new trial
absolute. The decision reserves the right in the court to grant a new
trial "in the other class of cases where the verdict is so grossly excessive as to be deemed to be the result of a disregard of the facts and
of the instructions of the court," but does not give an example of
what such cases might be. Chief Justice Baker found little satisfaction with the result, and Justice Stukes, the new Chief Justice, concurred in his opinion; however, the remainder of the court was apparently satisfied.
The same argument in seven other automobile cases involving
damages from $35,000 downward received no more comfort from the
court, and considerably less discussion.
4. 220 S.C. 426, 68 S.E. 2d 326 (1951).
5. 229 S.C. 39,91 S.E. 2d 552 (1956).
6. 227 S.C. 245, 87 S.E. 2d 830 (1955).

7. 210 S.C. 367, 42 S.E. 2d 705 (1947).
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Trial-The use of "stopping distance" charts, as prepared by the
Highway Department or other organizations, has become quite common in automobile accident cases, particularly as a basis for questions
on cross-examination. However, in Smith v. Hardy8 the Supreme
Court agreed with the trial Judge that such charts or statistics on
factual matters of this nature are not admissible in evidence unless
they are properly qualified by having the expert or person who made
them present to testify as to their nature, accuracy, etc. The court
further stated that such statistics were not sufficiently proved by
science to be the subject of acceptance under judicial notice.
A familiar tactic of trial lawyers is to ask questions in auto accident cases which will reveal to the jury that the opposing party was
charged with a traffic law violation by the investigating police officer.
In Wynn v. Rood9 plaintiff was asked by his own counsel if defendant had not been so charged. The trial Judge sustained defendant's objection, but refused to grant a mistrial. The Supreme Court
held that it was sufficient for the trial Judge to direct the jury to
disregard such questions. It is probably to be expected, therefore,
that the bringing in of such matter indirectly will continue unabated.
Certainly the risk of mistrial seems materially reduced.
Of the remaining automobile cases only Jacks v. Townse'nd 1°
and Swindler v. Peay'n produced noteworthy comments. In Jacks
the court pointed out that the scene of an occurrence is not "offered
in evidence" but that rather the court is requested to allow the jury
to view the scene, the granting of this request being discretionary
with the trial Judge. In Swindlcr the court reaffirmed the propriety
of charging the language of a criminal statute, if there is evidence
of a violation thereof sufficient to go to the jury, and such alleged
violation is material to the action.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit made further difficulty for the lawyer trying cases against stores brought by customers
who slip and fall in the aisles. In H. L. Green Co. v. Bowen,1 2
the court reiterated that plaintiff must prove either, (1) that the
store had actual notice of the defect causing the accident, or (2) that
the defect was in existence long enough to charge the store with constructive notice. In the court's view that period of time must clearly
be more than a "few minutes". To escape the consequences of the
rule will be difficult, for the plaintiff will be involved in contributory
8. 228 S.C. 112, 88 S.E. 2d 865 (1955).
9. 228 S.C. 577, 91 S.E. 2d 276 (196).
10. 228 S.C. 26, 88 S.E. 2d 776 (1955).
11. 227 S.C. 157, 87 S.E. 2d 296 (1955).
12. 223 F. 2d 523 (4th Cir. 1955).
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negligence problems if he proves that he knew of the defect for a
period of time. He will need third-party witnesses.
False Imprisonment
Evidence of involuntary confinement and mistreatment of plaintiff by defendants in Wright v. Gilbert,13 apparently weighed heavily
with the jury. Although an elderly woman, under the control of a
committee, she was awarded $25,000 damages against the defendants
for false imprisonment, the maximum asked in her complaint. Aside
from the size of the verdict, which clearly indicates the trend in tort
cases, the decision offers no new statement of law. The long-followed
rule of Westbrook v. Hutchinson14 is again quoted with approval:
The wrong may be committed by words alone, or by acts alone,
or by both, and may be merely operating on the will of the individual, or by personal violence, or by both. It is not necessary that the individual be confined within a prison, or within
walls, or that he be assaulted, or even touched. It is not necessary that there should be any injury done to the individual's
person, or to his character, or reputation. Nor is it necessary
that the wrongful act be committed with malice, or ill-will, or
even with the slightest wrongful intention.
Fraud
15

Turner v.Carey presented an unusual situation, as the complaint
was drawn on the basis of recission of a contract for fraud, but the
case was tried before the jury as one for recovery of damages for
fraud and deceit. The facts are of minor interest, but the situation
produced a clear and valuable statement of the law by Justice Oxner
which will doubtless be useful for citation for many years to come.
It is better to quote it than attempt a summary:
It will be helpful in deciding the questions presented to consider the remedies available to [one] who is induced to enter
into a contract of purchase by fraudulent misrepresentations on
the part of the seller. As a general rule, he has a choice of
several remedies. "He may, despite the fraud, elect to affirm
the contract, retain the property received under it, and bring
an action at law for fraud and deceit against the vendor to recover the damages sustained by reason of the fraud or misrepre13. 227 S.C. 334, 88 S.E. 2d 72 (1955).

14. 195 S.C. 101, 10 S.E. 2d 145 (1940).
15. 227 S.C. 298, 87 S.E. 2d 871 (1955).
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sentations, or, if sued for the agreed price, set off or recoup the
damages resulting from the fraud ..... .Instead of bringing
an action for damages, a defrauded purchaser may rescind the
sale and recover the consideration paid. Rescission for fraud
may be asserted as a defense to an action by the vendor for the
purchase money or damages . . . . The two remedies are
inconsistent, the one being based on the continued existence of
the sale, the other on its abrogation, and the purchaser cannot
in the one form of action secure the relief appropriate to the
other."
Libel and Slander
Both the South Carolina Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit handed down decisions in the field of libel and
slander. Both of them also made worthy contributions to the law by
making more definite statements as to (1) the defense of qualified
privilege and (2) the requirement of clearly defamatory words.
There are few areas in the law where the rule of liability is so rigid,
hence the great importance of clear definition of requirements and
exceptions.
In Cullum v.Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.16 the Supreme Court made
a long-needed statement as to the limit of liability of "credit" reporting agencies for erroneous credit reports. Justice Legge put this
State on the side of the majority in stating, "The defense of qualified privilege is available to a mercantile agency in respect of reports
on the credit and financial standing of an individual or business concern communicated confidentially, and in good faith, to a subscriber
having an interest in the particular matter" . . . and, although false,
is not actionable in absence of malice. Malice is, of course, a jury
question but the case illustrates that plaintiff must offer more evidence of malice than an error in the credit report.
In Jack's Cookie Company v. Brooks17 the Court of Appeals
examined the South Carolina cases and refused to give the alleged
libelous words more than their ordinary meaning. In a letter to customers, Jack's had advised that Brooks was no longer the sales representative of Jack's, then stated:
We are sorry that situations of this nature have to arise, but we
have no hesitancy in doing that which in our judgment is best
for the company, its distributors, representatives and customers.
16. 228 S.C. 384, 90 S.E. 2d 370 (1955).
17. 227 F. 2d 935 (4th Cir. 1955).
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You will be contacted as soon as possible by an official representative of this company.
Three recipients of the letter were permitted to testify that they
thought the letter implied wrongdoing by Brooks; but the court
stated, "The decision must rest upon the ordinary meaning of the
words and not upon mere speculation of the recipients of the letter
.. . the innuendo cannot enlarge or restrict the natural meaning of
the words, or introduce new matter." The result is a further adherence to the modern view that ambiguities of meaning cannot be
forced upon the words so as to make a jury question concerning
the effect on the minds of the hearers. 18

18. 130 S.C. 180, 125 S.E. 912 (1924).
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